Liberdade e determinação em Thomas Hobbes: a possível existência de um compatibilismo.

Abstract

This thesis aims to show Hobbes's doctrine about the relationship between human freedom and determinism, defending the hypothesis that there is a Hobbesian compatibilism. In the first chapter, our attention is focused on the general lines of Hobbes' thought, starting from his notion of philosophy – Logic, Politics and Ethics –, then on the world and its constitution. In the second chapter, we present a list of different theories about freedom and determinism, passing through indeterminist theory, rigid determinism and, finally, compatibilism. During the presentation of each theory, we did not fail to make comparisons between each one of them, as is the case of the incompatibist theory, which can be defended both by those who do not believe in the reality of determinism, and by those who do not believe in the reality of freedom human. Lastly, in the third chapter, it is the turn of Hobbes's ideas about freedom and determinism to appear in a central way, and we argue that, although Hobbes can be classified as a determinist, he cannot, however, be classified as a determinist rigorous, because its determinism does not deny all forms of freedom, but just some of them.