Philip Pettit, Harry Frankfurt e a Filosofia da Ação: uma crítica ao princípio das possibilidades alternativas (PPA).

Abstract

The philosophy of action investigates the essence of human actions by examining the underlying motivations, the mechanisms of execution, and the ethical implications involved. This field seeks to understand the foundations of human agency by exploring the intricate dynamics of decision-making and action realization. This work presents and analyzes the ethical dilemmas associated with the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a philosophical conception that links moral responsibility to freedom of choice. Focusing on this context, this dissertation, of a hermeneutic-bibliographic nature, aims to present the critical argument developed by Harry Frankfurt in opposition to PAP. Divided into two main chapters, the first offers a comprehensive understanding of theories of freedom, highlighting Philip Pettit's contribution to contemporary debates on freedom in the field of action. The theories encompass Rational, Volitional, and Discursive Control, which provide a comprehensive framework of the types of control that contribute to freedom in the field of human action. The second chapter focuses on Harry Frankfurt's approach to human action, exploring his emphasis on conscious and intentional action, underlying motivation, and the crucial role of freedom in decision-making. Furthermore, this chapter presents Harry Frankfurt's significant and influential argument against PAP, challenging conventional notions of moral responsibility and freedom of choice. He proposed hypothetical cases, known as Frankfurt cases, in which a person acts freely and voluntarily, even though they do not have the capacity to act differently due to the intervention of a manipulator. Thus, this work seeks not only to elucidate the central debates in the philosophy of action but also to highlight the relevance and originality of Harry Frankfurt's argument in this field.