Enfoque filosófico sobre a simplicidade divina em Tomás de Aquino como fundamento para os valores morais.

Abstract

This dissertation aims to present the connection between the metaphysical doctrine of divine simplicity and the doctrine that deals with the foundation of objective moral values in the philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas. To achieve this objective, after presenting, in general lines, the life and work of our author, an expository comment was made on the third question of the first part of the Summa Theologica, where we find a family of arguments in favor of the idea that God does not have and cannot have composition of any kind, that is, that the divine being is absolutely simple or that he cannot have any composition, whether material or spiritual, of essence and existence, or of any order. Then, we present the relationship of all this with moral values and human acts, indicating that divine simplicity serves as the foundation for the immutable and necessary character of moral values, and that God, as the first cause of all good, is also the ultimate cause of all good human action.